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“The Taliban are no longer a shadowy insurgency; they are now a full-fledged 
parallel political order.”
The Taliban’s War for Legitimacy 
in Afghanistan
ASHLEY JACKSON AND FLORIAN WEIGAND
M
ore than seventeen years after their fall 
from power, the Taliban control large 
swaths of territory in Afghanistan. While 
they continue to fight the Afghan government and 
the international forces that support it, they are also 
the de facto governing authority for many Afghans. 
The Taliban are no longer a shadowy insurgency; 
they are now a full-fledged parallel political order. 
They have increasingly sought local support so as 
to portray themselves as having more legitimacy to 
rule than the government they are at war with. With 
talks now well underway between the Taliban and 
the United States to secure a drawdown of US forces, 
it is clear that the movement will be a force in Af-
ghan politics for the foreseeable future.
The emergence of the Taliban in the mid-1990s 
was the product of a specific moment in Afghan 
history. The Taliban of today, fighting a US-led oc-
cupation and contending with a population that is 
far more educated and connected with the outside 
world, is a very different movement than the one 
that ruled Afghanistan two decades ago.
Afghanistan has been at war since 1979, when 
the Soviet Union invaded and occupied the coun-
try. When Soviet forces withdrew in 1989, the mu-
jahideen—the guerrilla factions that had forced 
their retreat—turned on one another and plunged 
the country into civil war. The Taliban were ini-
tially a rural uprising of religious students and for-
mer fighters disillusioned with the anarchy, rape, 
and pillage perpetrated by the mujahideen. Their 
original objectives were to rid their country of 
abusive commanders and to restore law and order 
under a pure Islamic government.
After the Taliban seized power in 1996, they 
became infamous for their harsh treatment of 
women. Their harboring of al-Qaeda rendered 
them a pariah state; following al-Qaeda’s Septem-
ber 2001 attacks on the United States, it resulted 
in the US-led invasion that toppled their regime. 
Key Taliban figures, including the group’s leader 
Mullah Omar, attempted to surrender when it be-
came clear that the regime was finished, but were 
mostly rebuffed by the Americans. Some were ar-
rested and sent to the prison camp at Guantana-
mo Bay, Cuba; others fled to Pakistan, where they 
later regrouped as an insurgency. Many minor 
Taliban members returned to their home villages 
to lead quiet lives.
Taliban leaders in Pakistan began sending small 
infiltration teams across the border into southern 
Afghanistan sometime around 2004, to lay the 
groundwork for insurgent operations and reforge 
old alliances. In 2005, Jalaluddin Haqqani’s old 
mujahideen faction switched sides from the gov-
ernment to the Taliban. This allowed the move-
ment to expand its reach into Haqqani territory 
in the southeast and gave it greater logistical and 
operational capacities. Violence rapidly escalated 
in 2006, when the Taliban orchestrated an aver-
age of 12 armed attacks and 4 remotely detonated 
bombings every day—triple and double the previ-
ous year’s rate, respectively.
The situation continued to deteriorate. The 
temporary US troop surge that began in late 2009, 
ordered by President Barack Obama in concert 
with NATO allies, only escalated the conflict. De-
spite being confronted with this heavy military 
pressure and the death of Mullah Omar in 2013 
(which the group kept secret for more than two 
years), the Taliban have consistently shown re-
markable resilience and the ability to adapt while 
avoiding fragmentation or disintegration.
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After the drawdown of the US troop surge was 
completed in 2014, the Taliban expanded and 
consolidated their reach. Between 2015 and 2018, 
the number of districts they control or influence 
doubled, according to the US special inspector 
general for Afghanistan reconstruction.
BROAD TENT
Part of the Taliban’s strength lies in accommodat-
ing a wide range of factions and actors, with diverse 
interests, under the broader tent of the movement. 
The Taliban is led by an emir, currently Sheikh Hai-
batullah Akhundzada. The emir has two deputies: 
Mullah Omar’s son, Mullah Yaqub, and Jalaluddin 
Haqqani’s son, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The emir is ad-
vised by a supreme leadership shura, or council, 
comprising key figures from across the movement’s 
ideological and geographic spectrum. While the 
Taliban include various personality-based factions 
that at times come into conflict with one another 
and vie for greater power and resources, acrimoni-
ous splits have been exceedingly rare.
Beneath this senior leadership layer is a military 
commission with regional commands, as well as 
a dozen or so civilian commissions akin to minis-
tries, covering everything from health and educa-
tion to finance and media relations. Senior leader-
ship structures are based in Pakistan, primarily in 
Quetta but also in Peshawar. The division of labor 
is partly geographic: operations under Quetta’s su-
pervision cover the south, southwest, west, and 
northwest of Afghanistan, while Peshawar has re-
sponsibility for the eastern, northeastern, south-
eastern, and central regions. This is an outgrowth 
of the Taliban’s decentralized regional command 
shuras from the early years of the insurgency; the 
two centers of gravity endure as power bases, even 
as the movement has become more coherent as a 
whole.
Inside Afghanistan, regional- and provincial-
level military structures exist alongside civilian 
ones. A given district will have Taliban officials for 
military operations, recruitment, and intelligence 
as well as health directors, tax collectors, judges, 
education monitors, and officials responsible for 
negotiating aid access with nongovernmental or-
ganizations. While some level of Taliban gover-
nance existed as early as 2006 in the form of shad-
ow governors and judges, it was not until nearly 
a decade later that these ruling structures func-
tioned in any systematic or consistent way. Today, 
the high-level commissions governing each sector 
are increasingly effective. There are clear chains of 
command from the leadership based in Pakistan 
down to villages in Afghanistan, and policies that 
they are able to implement. Of course, there are 
also regional variations and some degree of local 
differentiation.
Capacity to govern became a necessity as the 
Taliban regained territory and influence. Estimates 
vary, but according to the most reliable figures the 
Taliban control or have influence over around 60 
to 70 percent of Afghanistan. While the major cit-
ies remain under government control, the Taliban 
hold sway over vast areas of the countryside. Esti-
mates of their fighting strength are approximate at 
best, ranging between 70,000 and 100,000 armed 
men. These estimates do not include the unknown 
number of civilian administrators.
The Taliban’s safe havens in Pakistan have be-
come less important as they have extended their 
hold on Afghan territory and expanded their re-
source base, but Pakistan has nonetheless played 
a critical—if muddled—role in the post-2001 Tali-
ban’s resurrection. Elements associated with Paki-
stan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) pro-
vided significant financial, logistical, and technical 
aid to the movement, particularly in the early years 
of the insurgency. But the relationship is fraught: 
the ISI detained key Taliban leaders who were en-
gaged in early peace talks with the United States, 
and has generally sought to exert coercive control 
over a movement with an independent agenda. 
The Taliban rank and file are almost uniformly re-
sentful of Pakistan’s influence over the group and 
Afghanistan’s internal affairs in general.
Estimates of the Taliban’s annual budget range 
from $500 million to $2 billion, but these sums 
are difficult to trace or verify. The core of Taliban 
financing is the opium trade. While the Taliban 
banned poppy cultivation during their reign in the 
1990s, they have profited handsomely from it as 
an insurgency. Despite billions spent by the inter-
national community on countering narcotics since 
2001, the Afghan poppy crop is the source for 70–
90 percent of the world’s heroin trade and generates 
an estimated $2 billion annually. The Taliban also 
raise revenue by taxing entities ranging from large 
telecommunications and construction companies 
to farmers taking their harvest to market. They even 
collect on the state electricity company’s bills in 
many areas they control, netting millions annually.
SHADOW GOVERNMENT
In order to construct local legitimacy, the Tali-
ban draw on people’s frustrations with the Af-
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ghan government and the international forces. Air 
strikes that kill civilians and invasive night raids 
into the homes of ordinary people have helped the 
Taliban promote a strategic narrative that depicts 
them as liberators fighting against anti-Islamic oc-
cupation forces and a puppet regime in Kabul. The 
United Nations estimates that over 3,000 Afghan 
civilians have been killed in air strikes since 2009.
The Taliban also benefit from frustration with 
the rampant corruption that has permeated the 
government and almost all aspects of daily life 
in Afghanistan. After 2001, US financial support 
enriched local commanders, many of whom had 
been routed by the Taliban in the 1990s. These 
warlords have diverted money from reconstruc-
tion projects and government funds. Today, their 
wealth, networks, and control over parts of the 
armed forces and the government allow them to 
act with impunity. Local militias (Arbakai) associ-
ated with these figures are widely seen as abusive 
and extortive. The Taliban found their pathway to 
success in the 1990s by promoting themselves as 
a popular movement fighting 
corrupt warlords who were ex-
ploiting ordinary people. This 
narrative continues to be pow-
erful.
The Taliban’s attention to 
governance supports their nar-
rative of a fight against corrupt 
elites. This aspect has become particularly impor-
tant as the Taliban have gained greater territorial 
control and influence. In order to gain legitimacy, 
they must demonstrate that they have something 
to offer beyond violent resistance to what they see 
as a US occupation.
Alongside the Taliban’s military wing, their 
sophisticated system of parallel governance has 
spread across the country, collecting taxes, regu-
lating government-provided health care and edu-
cation, and dispensing justice. In taking over these 
functions, the Taliban seek to capitalize on the Af-
ghan government’s weaknesses to further under-
mine its legitimacy. However, the reality on the 
ground is complex. Afghans living in areas where 
the Taliban are present have little choice but to 
obey their rules. “At least they are less corrupt” 
is a common refrain among civilians in such ar-
eas, but they also frequently tell stories of Taliban 
abuses and intimidation.
Despite billions of dollars in foreign assistance, 
the Afghan Ministry of Education is still one of 
the most corrupt and dysfunctional government 
departments. One in twelve schools is a “ghost 
school” that exists only on paper, and teacher ab-
senteeism is widespread. Taliban education moni-
tors coerce teachers into showing up and observe 
their work, forcing the removal of those who fail 
to perform to their standards. They have removed 
subjects seen as “un-Islamic,” such as civic educa-
tion, from the curriculum, and banned a culture 
textbook that included a photo of female police of-
ficers. They have also introduced religious educa-
tion into schools and prevented girls from attend-
ing secondary school in many areas under their 
control.
A particularly important element of the Tali-
ban’s shadow governance structure is the provi-
sion of justice. Government courts are often avail-
able only in district or provincial centers, resulting 
in high transportation costs for people from more 
rural areas. Cases tend to drag on for years. Brib-
ery is rife, if not a requirement to get a case settled; 
often the party that pays the most money or has 
better connections to the official involved is likely 
to win the case.
By contrast, Taliban courts 
have a reputation for being ac-
cessible, fast, cheap, and fairer, 
or at least less corrupt, than 
their government counterparts. 
In many districts, the Taliban 
deploy judges who hold session 
once or twice a week. Their court system reaches 
far beyond the area they can be said to control: 
some people who live in areas that are only under 
Taliban influence or in cities under government 
control may still bring their cases to the Taliban 
courts. They do not necessarily support or favor 
the Taliban, but may feel that they have no viable 
alternative.
For instance, if two families cannot agree on 
who owns a certain piece of land, they can go to 
a Taliban court on one of the scheduled days in a 
nearby village. If only one party requests a ruling, 
the judge will ask both sides to appear at the next 
court date with documents or witnesses that sup-
port their position—and will reach a decision by 
the end of that day. Bribes are less common than 
they are in government courts, and a party who 
disagrees with a verdict can request that an ap-
peals court hear the case.
Few appear to do so, however, probably for fear 
of incurring the anger of the Taliban judge whose 
decision they wish to reverse. Many Afghans say 
the quickness of rulings is an asset but also raises 
In most areas under  
their control, the  
Taliban are local people.
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questions. The efficiency and consistency of these 
courts provide a certain level of predictability, al-
beit sometimes at the cost of due process. Taliban 
justice may be swift and relatively accessible, and 
better than the alternative, but it is not necessarily 
well-informed or just. There is also a significant 
difference in the handling of civil cases, like land 
disputes, and criminal cases. Criminal punish-
ments include amputations, beatings, and public 
shamings, and those convicted of “spying” are 
routinely executed.
The Taliban also collect taxes far beyond the 
borders of areas in which they have achieved ter-
ritorial dominance. There is a high degree of co-
ercion involved, and most people have little al-
ternative but to pay. But Taliban taxes are often 
seen as more predictable and less onerous than the 
fees and bribes levied by government officials or 
at pro-government checkpoints. Along with or-
dinary people, the Taliban now often tax Afghan 
corporations, construction firms, and aid agencies 
in many areas, bringing in steady revenues.
The Taliban’s strategy is 
to gradually increase their 
control over society. They 
use their parallel governance 
system to keep people at 
least marginally satisfied and 
boost perceptions of their 
legitimacy. This, in com-
bination with their coercive power, secures the 
population. The Taliban provide services against 
a backdrop of violence targeting those who pose 
a threat to them, whether it is the summary ex-
ecution of Afghan security forces personnel or 
spectacular attacks in cities that also kill civilians. 
Such violence sends a warning to the the civilian 
population.
THREAT PERCEPTION
There are a number of dividing lines in how the 
Taliban are perceived, whether geographic, eco-
nomic, or ethnic and tribal. Most crucially, there 
is a divide between major cities, particularly Ka-
bul, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif, and more rural and 
remote parts of the country. Particularly in urban 
areas, the lives of many have improved consider-
ably since 2001. These are also the places that suf-
fered the brunt of Taliban brutality in the 1990s. 
In these areas, the Taliban are often described as a 
threat to Afghanistan that originates in Pakistan, 
or as a movement primarily made up of Pakistani 
madrassa students. They are depicted as foreigners 
or proxies of foreign governments rather than real 
Afghans, and thus delegitimized.
Others struggle to understand why the interna-
tional forces cannot defeat the Taliban. They see 
the Taliban’s resurrection as part of a grand strat-
egy orchestrated by the United States that aims at 
undermining Afghanistan’s stability. In this narra-
tive, the Taliban’s purported role as a US pawn or 
proxy also renders them illegitimate.
However, considering the Taliban’s level of con-
trol and influence in Afghanistan today, it is hardly 
accurate to characterize them as something “exter-
nal.” The extent of their control does not rest only 
on force and coercion. The Taliban have a domestic 
support base; its core comprises those who have 
suffered most in the conflict and have been pro-
foundly marginalized by the post-2001 political 
settlement. In most areas under their control, the 
Taliban are local people. They are from the same 
villages that they rule, which gives them a deep 
understanding of the specific local context and the 
people’s problems, grievances, and expectations.
People in places like Kabul 
have better access to educa-
tion, health care, and govern-
ment employment. They can 
more easily participate in the 
democratic process. Corrup-
tion also matters in the cities, 
of course, undermining the 
state’s legitimacy. For instance, government jobs 
often can be obtained only through personal net-
works or bribes, resulting in the marginalization 
of those who lack the right networks and financial 
means. Even so, most do not consider the Taliban 
a viable alternative—for historical, ideological, 
political, and cultural reasons.
Just as the Taliban seek to undermine the Af-
ghan government by delivering basic services, 
they also aim to do so through violence. Attacks 
on security forces and government offices in sup-
posedly safe cities like Kabul have a high symbolic 
value. They enable the Taliban to illustrate their 
power and undermine the legitimacy of the state. 
These attacks serve as a warning to those siding 
with the government, and demonstrate that it is 
incapable of protecting the people even in its re-
maining strongholds. Even among those who are 
existentially opposed to the Taliban returning to 
power, such attacks chip away at their confidence 
in and support for the government.
In the context of the current peace talks, oth-
er fears are growing. People in places like Kabul 
Capacity to govern became  
a necessity as the Taliban  
regained territory and influence.
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are worried about losing the freedoms they have 
gained since 2001 if the Taliban reimpose their 
harsh rule of the late 1990s. A particular concern 
is what may happen to women’s rights if the Tali-
ban become part of a new government, extending 
their influence over Kabul and the other urban 
centers.
At least in theory, the Afghan constitution 
grants equal rights to women. While this has not 
translated into general practice, women today play 
an important role in all sectors of society—at least 
in Kabul and other major urban areas. Walking 
through Kabul, it is easy to find coffeehouses filled 
with young people, including many women.
The Taliban’s approach to women’s rights re-
mains deeply conservative, even though their pol-
icy is not consistent and varies across the country. 
In general, the freedoms of women living under 
Taliban rule—even in already conservative rural 
areas—are significantly curtailed. More broadly, 
the variance in the Taliban’s approach to women’s 
rights reflects how different rural communities 
in Afghanistan think about the role of women. 
While some rural areas are more progressive, large 
parts of the countryside remain conservative. This 
mindset stands in stark contrast to the more edu-
cated and liberal communities within Kabul and 
other major urban areas.
The diversity of experiences, views, traditions, 
and practices in Afghanistan is often overlooked. 
It is a deeply divided country, and this divide is at 
the root of the conflict.
INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH
When they ruled the country, the Taliban were 
notoriously closed to outsiders and shrouded in 
mystery. They shunned major media; access to 
their top leadership, particularly Mullah Omar, 
was closely guarded. Their relative openness and 
media savvy as an insurgency have marked a sub-
stantial shift from the 1990s. Early on, they estab-
lished a fairly sophisticated media operation that 
began to produce an English-language website 
with regular press releases, readily responded to 
press inquiries via cell phone and messaging apps, 
and spread their propaganda on social media plat-
forms like Twitter.
The Taliban have increasingly sought to engage 
with the international community. While many re-
main reluctant to deal directly with the Taliban, 
the UN and aid organizations engage with them on 
humanitarian and human-rights concerns. Mul-
lah Omar issued a letter in 2007 ordering Taliban 
fighters to facilitate polio vaccinations and calling 
on parents to have their children vaccinated “for 
the benefit of our next generations.” This procla-
mation was an outcome of negotiations with the 
UN at a time when few entities were willing to en-
gage with the Taliban at all. While this kind of hu-
manitarian dialogue does not bestow official rec-
ognition on the group (in the UN’s view, at least), 
it does implicitly recognize that Taliban support 
is required for achieving international priorities 
such as eradicating polio in Afghanistan.
In 2011, Taliban representatives began a confi-
dential, routine dialogue with representatives from 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on 
civilian casualties—a dialogue that was initiated 
by the Taliban. They have consistently referred to 
civilian casualties caused by international and Af-
ghan government forces as a justification for their 
operations, despite the fact that the Taliban them-
selves have long been responsible for the majority 
of civilian deaths.
The UN estimates that armed opposition groups 
are responsible for 23,050 civilian deaths since 2009 
(when it started keeping records), nearly four times 
the number attributed to pro-government forces. In 
its latest report, the UN said 2018 was the deadliest 
year so far for civilians, with 3,804 deaths.
Whether the Taliban have taken any steps to 
spare civilians is unclear; the number of civilian 
casualties attributed to them has consistently in-
creased year after year. However, they have pub-
licly cited the talks with the UN to support their 
claims that they are attempting to protect civilians. 
The Taliban pursue this kind of dialogue because 
it confers on them some form of recognition by 
the international community, however limited that 
might be, and deflects criticism of the harm they 
are causing to civilians on the ground.
A pivotal shift in international legitimacy came 
in 2013, when the Taliban opened a political office 
in Doha, Qatar. The office was opened with the 
consent of the United States, after a long series of 
secret talks among the Taliban and the Qatari and 
US governments. The Taliban soon moved their 
political commission to Qatar. The office initially 
stirred controversy and then languished for years, 
as once hopeful prospects for peace talks faltered. 
Nonetheless, their Doha presence gave the Taliban 
an accessible address, free from Pakistan’s control 
and located outside the conflict zone.
Talks are now underway between the United 
States and the Taliban. The Trump administration, 
eager to end the war and bring the troops home, 
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appointed Zalmay Khalilzad as special representa-
tive for Afghanistan reconciliation in September 
2018. Khalilzad has advanced the talks rapidly. 
The Taliban’s key demand is the withdrawal of 
US troops, and most Taliban fighters will be ready 
to lay down arms if this condition is met. It has 
long been clear that the Taliban are willing to meet 
the core US demands of renouncing al-Qaeda and 
pledging not to give foreign terrorist groups safe 
harbor in Afghanistan. The Taliban for some time 
have been fighting against factions of the Islamic 
State that emerged in Afghanistan.
At least a partial US withdrawal looks all but 
agreed; in December 2018, President Donald 
Trump reportedly ordered the pullout of half 
the remaining 14,000 US troops in the country. 
The future of Afghanistan, however, looks more 
precarious than ever. The real question now is 
whether the parties to the conflict can broker an 
intra-Afghan settlement that will ensure stable 
governance in the future. There are clear ideo-
logical differences between the Taliban and the 
various factions that comprise the Afghan govern-
ment, and those factions are increasingly divided. 
The Taliban continue to refuse to engage with the 
government in any formal talks.
The Taliban’s success is not only a setback for Af-
ghan President Ashraf Ghani and the international 
community, which has supported the government 
with more than $100 billion in aid over the past sev-
enteen years. The Taliban’s increasing international 
legitimacy and the progress in the peace talks pose 
a threat to those Afghans who have benefited most 
from the post-2001 government. A peace agree-
ment with the Taliban threatens to erase what they 
have achieved, including the country’s slow transi-
tion toward democracy and the modest acceptance 
of women’s rights. While the Taliban are willing to 
talk to the United States to secure the withdrawal 
of foreign forces, it is less clear whether they will 
be able to come to an agreement with their Afghan 
adversaries. ■
